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Abstract. The current EU–US negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) may 
result in a comprehensive agreement which will be able to shape not only the traditional trade agenda but will 
cover a set of non-trade matters as well. Specifically, the environmental impacts as a matter of public concern are 
at the centre of attention of both the academia and the civil society. The proposed paper intends to analyse two 
aspects of the likely implications which could be triggered by the future transatlantic agreement. First, the policy 
level of the analysis is focusing on the question of how the contracting parties will integrate the environmental 
concerns into the agreement and how these concerns could be reconciled with the standard trade concerns and 
principles. Second, the TTIP could also have a direct impact on the environmental regulation; for this reason, the 
paper will also focus on the regulatory level. The paper concludes that a carefully planned agreement will not 
constrain the policy leeway of the EU in the field of the environmental protection, however, the EU negotiators 
have to pay very close attention to choosing the right models, methods and formulations in the future text of the 
agreement.
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1. INTRODUCTION
‘@MalmstromEU: what TTIP changes for our rules on e.g. consumer protection, food 
safety and environment? The simple answer is... No change.’ – The statement of Cecilia 
Malmström, European Commissioner for trade, rapidly spread on Twitter on 15th October 
2015.1 If one would interpret this in a restrictive manner, suggesting the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will not have any impact on the EU regulation, the title 
of the present paper would offer a completely pointless challenge. However, we want to 
read this tweet in a slightly more permissive way, which would not exclude a more complex 
answer and therefore the premise of the present paper is that the TTIP might have 
implications specifically on the environmental regulation. This premise is not a revolutionary 
finding since the environmental effects of the TTIP are one of the most debated issues 
relating to the current trade negotiations between the European Union and the United States. 
Many experts warn that the future of transatlantic agreements might lead to a rollback in the 
European Union’s environmental regulation, putting at risk the principle of high level of 
protection of the EU environmental law. The present paper intends to analyse two aspects 
of the potential implications that could be triggered by the future transatlantic agreement. 
      *  JD, PhD, research fellow at the HAS CSS Institute for Legal Studies (Budapest, Hungary) and 
associate professor at Széchenyi István University, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences (Győr, 
Hungary). E-mail: Horvathy.Balazs@tk.mta.hu. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 
UACES 45th Annual Conference (Bilbao, Spain, 7–9 September 2015), and the conference on ‘The 
European Union and the Politicization of Europe’ (Euroacademia, Anglo-American University, 
Prague, Czech Republic, 27–28 November 2015). The underlying research of this article was carried 
out as part of the project on ‘Policy Opportunities for Hungary in the European Union: the Analysis of 
the Legal Framework’ conducted by the MTA Lendület-HPOPs Research Group. Manuscript closed: 
01/10/2016
1 See the Press conference of Cecilia Malmström (2015) link 1.
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First, the policy level of the analysis focuses on the question of how to integrate the 
environmental concerns in the trade agreement. This is important as the EU, when 
implementing the Common Commercial Policy and entering into trade negotiations, 
is required by the provisions of the Founding Treaties to place environmental concerns in 
the trade agenda and integrate them into the targeted trade agreement. This policy level of 
the question can be considered as a part of the ‘Trade and Environment’ debate, which has 
been at the centre of attention of the international trade discourse since the 1990s.2 
The importance of the subject can be explained partly by the fact that the two areas represent 
an ‘ideological’ policy conflict between the free trade concept and the environmental 
thinking, which underpins the policies behind the international regulation. The European 
Union for the last two decades has been involved in this debate, it has a very strong 
commitment to introducing significant reform with the aim of providing wider 
accommodation for environmental measures within the world trade law.3 Additionally, it is 
notable that the EU’s focus is not placed separately on environmental aspects, but it attempts 
to include these interests in conformity with other societal concerns, like the social policy, 
labour standards or human rights.4 The integration of environmental – and other societal – 
concerns is a flagship issue also in the ongoing transatlantic negotiations and therefore, the 
outcome can influence – at the policy level – the future relation between the trade and 
environmental policies in the European Union. 
Second, the TTIP can also have a direct impact on the environmental regulation; for 
this reason, the paper will focus on the regulatory level as well. It is well known that the 
declared objective of the planned transatlantic trade agreement is to unify the standards of 
the European Union and the United States as much as possible by regulatory cooperation. 
However, an improper design of regulatory cooperation carries considerable risks for 
environmental protection in the EU, as environmental standards might be lowered if for 
instance the rules on harmonisation can result in a ‘race to the bottom’ effect. 
Considering the fact that the TTIP negotiations are still in progress, the subject of this 
paper can be regarded as some sort of a ‘moving target’, and therefore, the scope and the 
extent of the analysis have to be restricted more or less to an abstract level of problems 
raised by the topic. Even if the negotiation mandate,5 the negotiating directives6 or the 
available text proposals of the European Commission can give certain hints on how the 
TTIP could address a specific question,7 it is always to be taken into account that these 
documents never represent the final and compromised text of the future agreement. In other 
2 See the ‘Trade and Environment’ debate in e.g. Araya et al. (2001) and Santarius et al. (2004). 
3 Prost (2005) 411–59. 
4 For human rights requirements, see Arts (2000). For labour requirements in general context, 
see Thomas (2002) 791–819.
5 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on a 
comprehensive trade and investment agreement, called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, between the European Union and the United States of America. COM (12.3.2013) 136 
final. 
6 Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between 
the European Union and the United States of America. ST 11103/13 (17 June 2013). EU restricted 
document, declassified on 9 October 2014.
7 Alternatively, we also use conceptual models of other EU trade agreements, e.g. the adopted 
text of the CETA can give some orientations in a certain issue if we presuppose that the EU will 
represent a similar position in the TTIP negotiations. 
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words, until negotiations commence, we can only speculate about the likely implications 
arising from hypothetical regulatory options. The genuine effects of the TTIP will be seen 
only after the agreement has entered into force. Keeping in mind this reservation, the first 
introductory chapter (‘2. Trade Negotiations, Environmental Concerns and the Mandate of 
the European Union’) makes an attempt to explain why the environmental concerns are 
important for the European Union in the ongoing negotiations, and then, the policy level is 
examined (‘3. Policy Impacts of the TTIP: The Integration of Environmental Concerns into 
the Trade Agreements’), which is followed by the analysis of the regulatory issues 
(‘4. Regulatory Impacts of the TTIP: The Regulatory Cooperation and the Environmental 
Standards’), and finally, the paper closes with some concluding remarks (‘5. Conclusion – 
How to avoid the “race to the bottom” harmonisation’). 
2. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS  
AND THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The trade negotiations between the EU and the US on the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) were launched in 2013, aiming to be the most ambitious – 
‘comprehensive’ (Barroso)8 and ‘high-standard’ (Obama)9 – trade agreement ever attempted, 
due to both its scale and its significance for the transatlantic relationship between the 
European Union and the United States. Moreover, this time, the chances of success of an 
agreement have seemed more feasible than ever,10 even though at this moment in time, the 
negotiations have slowed down and it is not expected to find a compromise until the end of 
2016 for predominantly political reasons (e.g. the current US presidential election, and 
approaching federal election in Germany, and the presidential election in France in 2017). 
Moreover, the TTIP could overstep the borders of the multilateral framework of the trade 
liberalisation, doing far more than to eliminate merely the already low average tariffs and 
target the non-tariff barriers as well, which are a typical trade obstacles for the relations 
  8 ‘A future deal will give a strong boost to our economies on both sides of the Atlantic. It will 
be a comprehensive agreement going beyond tariffs, by integrating markets and removing barriers. 
It is estimated that, when this agreement is up and running, the European economy will get a stimulus 
of half a per cent of our GDP – which translates into tens of billions of euros every year and tens of 
thousands of new jobs.’ Speech of José Manuel Durão Barroso, former President of the European 
Commission. (2015) link 2. 
  9 ‘Promoting growth, creating jobs, strengthening the middle class – these are the principles 
that animate President Obama’s economic policies, including this Administration’s trade policy. 
As President Obama said […], TTIP can be a success if “we can achieve the kind of high-standard, 
comprehensive agreement that the global trading system is looking to us to develop.”’ Michael 
Froman, the US Trade Representative cited president Obama in his speech, see Froman (2013) 
135–36.
10 From an economic point of view, the growth is weak equally in the EU and the US, however, 
the monetary and fiscal policy instruments are largely exhausted: Felbermayr & Larch (2013). 
The trade growth has been slow-moving because of the effects of the financial crisis of 2008–2009 
and competing subsidy and regulatory policies that impede commercial activity, see Schott & Cimino 
(2013). Structural reforms are demanded in both regions, from which the prospect of economic 
growth is expected. Moreover, both the EU and the US have widely lost market shares in the last two 
decades. Therefore, the liberalization of bilateral trade relations could increase their ability to compete 
with the emerging economies.
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between the well-developed industrial nations.11 These barriers also include the measures 
applied by the Member States for achieving public policy objectives. The question can be 
raised concerning the possible consequence of a comprehensive trade agreement between 
the EU and US as to why the European Union has been consistently conducting a ‘values-
driven trade policy’ in the last decades and strongly prioritises the environmental concerns 
in case of a trade agreement as well. 
In order to understand the specific relation and sensitivity of the European Union to 
the ‘trade and environment’ issues, it is worth highlighting two major factors. First, Europe 
has always had a stronger commitment to social and environmental concerns, in comparison, 
e.g., to the United States. More literally, the idea of Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations 
regarding the concept of the ‘invisible hand’ has never gained importance in Europe,12 
and as a result, the European Union and also the governments of the Members States 
compared to the US are seen as charged not only to promote liberty but also to reduce 
inequalities in society. This attitude has led to far-reaching regulatory interventions also in 
the environmental area and explains the social context of the above ‘sensitivity’ of the EU 
in these issues (which is, thus, oversensitivity in the eyes of the USA). 
Secondly, in contrast to other countries, the environmental awareness in the European 
Union has actually a strong basis rooted in the treaties. The objectives and principles of the 
external trade policy of the EU (Common Commercial Policy) before the Treaty of Lisbon 
were laid down in a homogeneous and closed structure. This consistency was based 
primarily, as a leading principle, on the liberalisation, which allowed the legal and political 
framework of the Common Commercial Policy to develop according to the logic in line 
with its free-trade commitments to the international economic law and the legal order of 
WTO. However, the expansion of the external policy horizon of the European Communities 
and the introduction of new policy areas led to conflicts of objectives more frequently, 
causing tensions between the CCP and other external policy areas. Due to the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Common Commercial Policy has become an integral part of the Union’s 
external action. The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) have made it clear13 that the EU has to ensure consistency 
between the different areas of its external action and pursue and implement the general 
principles and objectives in the whole field of the EU external relations. 
The CCP is founded on a two-level structure of values, principles and objectives now, 
which encompasses not only inner principles like liberalisation but also the peripheral 
values and principles outside the trade policy including the sustainable development and 
environmental concerns as well. Therefore, when implementing the Common Commercial 
Policy, the European Union is required by its own constitutional structure to put the 
environmental concerns on the agenda of the trade negotiations and integrate them into the 
targeted trade agreement. 
11 According to the EU Commission’s document, it is actually an average of 4%, see the 
Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive 
trade and investment agreement, called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, between 
the European Union and the United States of America. COM(12.3.2013) 136 final. There are some 
tariffs peaks for sensitive products on both sides of the Atlantic, e.g. tobacco, textiles and clothing, 
sugar, footwear, dairy products and some vegetables. 
12 Krämer (2004). 
13 The consistency requirement regarding the EU external action is laid down in Article 21.3 
TEU. Specifically to the Common Commercial Policy, Article 205 TFEU requires the application of 
the general objectives and principles of the EU external action. 
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3. POLICY IMPACTS OF THE TTIP:  
THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS  
INTO THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
As mentioned above, since the 1990s, the environmental concerns became a standard item 
in the negotiation of international trade agreements. The principal reason for connecting 
environmental issues to the trade agenda is closely connected to policy tensions that are 
rooted in domestic environmental measures, which can oppose the efforts to further 
liberalisation in trade and leads often to trade barriers. Moreover, the liberalised and 
growing trade have environmental impacts in terms of conventional pollution, as well as air 
pollution, forest and species depletion, etc. This tension can be observed as typical policy 
conflicts, which the negotiating parties, according to their domestic policy priorities, address 
(or intentionally not)14 in the trade agreement. Countries involved are interested in more 
liberalisation, but the emerging importance of the environmental protection requires 
maintaining the adequate measures that can manifest as restrictive trade practices. These 
tensions are stimulated by two concrete factors as well. Globalising economic systems 
increases general incentives for engaging in international trade15 hence the growth-oriented 
policies are causing harmful environmental impacts. The international trade law, with the 
single purpose of increasing trade flows, is unlikely to have a neutral effect on the world’s 
environment. There is a natural tendency for trading countries to try the effectiveness of 
their environmental regulation, as well as to influence the environmental behaviour of 
others,16 by resorting to trade measures, including import bans and other restrictive 
measures. The unilateral trade instruments in question are harshly criticised mostly by the 
developing countries, which see these measures as nothing but ‘green protectionism’17 of 
the developed nations. As a consequence of the evolving environmental awareness, 
countries nowadays could not avoid addressing these conflicts and questions in their trade 
agreements. The examples of the major ongoing trade negotiations obviously support this 
trend.18 
From the perspective of the negotiations, the real question is how this policy conflict 
between trade and environment can be addressed and reconciled successfully within the 
framework of an international trade agreement with incorporated environmental concerns. 
A successful outcome is that the negotiating parties have found an adequate solution to 
consider the environmental impact of their trade agreement and laid down normative 
14 The premise of the following analysis is that the negotiating parties want to regulate and 
resolve this conflict. However, it cannot be neglected that the parties also have other (policy) options. 
There are examples of international agreement provisions, the goal of which is to avoid something 
special to regulate. Often, the reason for this option is that the negotiating could not find mutual 
compromise, or with the avoidance of strict or precise regulation they want to leave more space for 
interpretation – they do not want to confine the room for the future policy options. However, our 
starting point is that the parties want to regulate and integrate the environmental objectives in their 
trade agreement, they want to tackle common environmental challenges, and they are aware of these 
challenges, even though these challenges are not necessarily equally shared in the contraction parties. 
15 Dillon (2002) 120. 
16 Dillon (2002) 120.
17 Dagne (2010) 441, Keukeleire & Delreux (2014) 202–03. 
18 Excluding the subject of this paper, the TTIP, and other agreements negotiated by the EU 
(e.g. with Canada), the United States’ recent negotiation on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
can be taken as example. For a detailed analysis, see Meltzer & Voon (2014). 
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provisions regarding the relationship of the trade and environmental policy objectives. The 
EU and the US, in this case, do not want to address the trade policy objectives in an isolated 
context but want to reflect and incorporate the environmental concerns. It is evident that the 
above success is influenced by the framework, namely by the substantive and the procedural 
components of the trade agreement. The substantive components refer to the content of the 
agreement and imply the obligations and rights of the contracting parties. However, the 
procedural aspect of a trade agreement ensures that these obligations and rights can be 
really effectuated. 
The role and stance of the European Union to the ‘Trade and Environment’ debate, 
compared to with the US position, represent a very strong commitment to the real inclusion 
of environmental concerns into the legal framework of the world trade. From the perspective 
of the ongoing negotiation on a transatlantic free trade and investment partnership 
agreement, it means that a successful compromise can be reached only if the striking 
divergences between the positions of the parties are reconciled. However, it is hard to pave 
the way for a mutually acceptable agreement because of the big differences in the positions 
of the parties and because of their specific interest. At the current stage of the negotiations, 
it is hardly possible to foresee which compromise could be found regarding the disputed 
issues, in which the EU has expressed crucial interest in the last two decades, e.g., GMOs, 
hormone treated beef and pork, chlorine-sterilized chicken, or the recent disagreements on 
fracking shale gas reserves. 
However, is the reconciliation of these positions required? Technically, no! 
An agreement could be concluded without the real inclusion of ‘bridges’ between the trade 
and environmental concerns. There would be a very small chance of the ratification of such 
a treaty. The specificity of the EU’s position to the ‘Trade and Environment’ issues has its 
roots in the EU law (examined above) and also in a European sensitivity to environmental 
concerns. Therefore, an agreement without the real inclusions would be politically 
unacceptable in Europe. The question can be raised of what kind of a compromise would 
mean a real solution that can bring trade as well as environment concerns together. 
Essentially, four basic concerns could be highlighted, which are pivotal elements of an 
environmentally conscious trade agreement and therefore it could be considered as the 
major policy impact of the TTIP. 
An environmentally conscious trade agreement19 sets down the most important, 
environmentally relevant principles and objectives and makes clear the relationship between 
these principles and the free trade principles, such as progressive liberalisation. It is 
important to ensure that these principles and objectives have legal effects as well e.g., as 
tools of the interpretation in the dispute settlements, and that the principles of the free trade 
should not overrule the environmental principles and objectives. The principle structure of 
the EU funding treaties furnishes a good instance of that solution when introducing a 
consistency requirement between the environmental concerns, as the general principle of 
the EU’s external activities, and the free trade and progressive liberalisation, as principles 
of the Common Commercial Policy. The negotiation mandate of the European Union is a 
good base towards this compromise, but at this time, the details in this regard are still not 
clear. According to negotiation mandate, this part of the agreement i.e., its preamble, should 
express the commitment to sustainable development and the contribution of international 
trade to sustainable development ‘(…) in its economic, social and environmental 
dimensions, including economic development, full and productive employment and decent 
19 For this concept, see Horváthy (2013); Horváthy (2014). 
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work for all as well as the protection and preservation of the environment and natural 
resources (…).’20 However, the notion of sustainable development is questionable. If this 
reference is interpreted in context with the EU law, the proposition of the EU is that the 
agreement should recognise the sustainable development as an overarching objective as 
well as the aim of the parties at promoting high level of protection for the environment. 
In this regard, the mandate also emphasises a specific objective. The agreement should also 
recognise that the Parties will not encourage trade or foreign direct investment by lowering 
domestic environmental standards – the agreement should prevent the ‘race to the bottom’ 
effect, which could lead to sinking the level of protection in the contracting parties.
The agreement should also cover substantive provisions, which enables the parties to 
introduce measures with the intention to achieve environmental objectives. However, 
the real question is whether the guarantees should also be established, which can prevent 
the parties from introducing illicit discriminatory measures. The mandate is not clear 
enough in this regard as it only refers to general statements that are in line with the proposed 
principles and objectives. The substantial content of this future chapter is questionable. 
Consideration will be given to measures to facilitate and promote trade in environmentally 
friendly and resource-efficient goods, services and technologies including green public 
procurement and to support informed purchasing choices by consumers.21 Moreover, the 
agreement will also include provisions to promote adherence to and effective implementation 
of internationally agreed standards and agreements in the labour and environmental domain 
as a necessary condition for sustainable development.22 The importance of implementation 
as well as the enforcement of domestic legislation on labour and environment should also 
be stressed. It should also include provisions in support of internationally recognised 
standards of corporate social responsibility, as well as of the conservation, sustainable 
management and promotion of trade in legally obtained and sustainable natural resources, 
such as timber, wildlife or fisheries. The future agreement will foresee the monitoring of the 
implementation of these provisions through a mechanism including civil society 
participation, as well as one to address any disputes.
It should also be noted that the mandate refers, among the market access rules, to the 
general exceptions under the WTO law, noting that the agreement should have a general 
exception clause based on Articles XX and XXI GATT and Articles XIV and XIVbis GATS. 
In context with the non-tariff barriers, the agreement should also reflect on the specificity of 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS). According to the mandate on SPS measures, 
the negotiations shall follow the former negotiating directives of the EU.23 The parties shall 
establish provisions that build upon the WTO SPS Agreement and, on the provisions of the 
existing veterinary agreement, introduce disciplines with regard to plant health and set up a 
bilateral forum for improved dialogue and cooperation on SPS issues. Moreover, the chapter 
on the SPS measures should be based on ‘(…) the key principles of the WTO SPS 
Agreement, including the requirement that each side’s SPS measures be based on science 
and on international standards or scientific risk assessments, applied only to the extent 
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and developed in a transparent 
20 See COM (12.3.2013) 136, paragraph 6. 
21 See Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the European Union and the United States of America. ST 11103/13 (17 June 2013), 
paragraph 31. 
22 COM (12.3.2013) 136, paragraph 25.
23 Adopted by the Council on 20 February 1995, see Council Doc. 4976/95. 
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manner, without undue delay (…).’24 In addition, the proposed agreement should also cover 
the technical regulations, which is also an important regulatory area from an environmental 
perspective. In line with the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the 
EU’s mandate also expects provisions in this area. The objectives of these provisions would 
be to generate greater openness, transparency and convergence in regulatory approaches 
and requirements and related standards-development processes, as well as, inter alia, to 
reduce burdensome testing and certification requirements, promote confidence in our 
respective conformity assessment bodies and enhance cooperation in conformity assessment 
and standardisation issues globally. This requirement leads to the regulatory implications as 
well which are thoroughly exposed in the next section. 
An essential element of the future agreement should also be the dispute settlement 
system, an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism – ISDS, which is able to reconcile 
effectively the disagreements of the contracting parties and the investors. In this regard, the 
main point, raised in the early summaries of the negotiation mandate, is that the dispute 
settlement procedure should be applied also to the ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ 
chapter of the future agreement. However, it is questionable how the ISDS mechanism 
relates to the parties’ right to regulate in the field of the environmental matters. If no specific 
provisions would be laid down in this regard, the environmental legislation of the member 
states could be easily attacked by the investors as all domestic environmental measures that 
might have implications on the trade are to be regarded as potential trade restriction. 
The turning point in this issue was that the European Commission proposed a new system 
of dispute settlement mechanism in 2015,25 which was based on an entirely new approach 
establishing a permanent system consisting of a Tribunal and an Appellate Tribunal. 
The concept of the Investment Court System has been channelled into the TTIP 
negotiations26 and the new approach also touches upon all current trade agreements under 
negotiation and ratification. From the perspective of the environmental concerns, the most 
important part of the concept is the clarification of the parties’ public policy leeway, certain 
aspects of the right to regulate principle, in specific areas including the environmental 
policy. According to the Commission’s proposal, the dispute settlement provisions should 
not affect the right of the parties to regulate within their territories through measures 
necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives and the notion of legitimate policy 
objectives covers the environment amongst other concerns. This part of the concept seems 
to be immensely significant, however, at this stage of the negotiations it is not clear and 
questions remain whether the EU proposal will be accepted by the US negotiators. This 
question is vital indeed, because even if the final text will cover the above exceptions, the 
Court (or whatever dispute settlement body will be institutionalised by the TTIP) will have 
wide autonomy in interpreting the broad concepts of these exceptions. Consequently the 
dispute settlement mechanism might also have indirect effects27 on the environmental 
regulation when shaping the scope of the exceptions. 
24 See COM (12.3.2013) 136, paragraph 18.
25 Commission proposes new Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU trade and 
investment negotiations – Press release (2015) link 8. 
26 Commission draft text – Investment (2015) link 7. 
27 From a legal point of view, the ISDS can never have direct effect on the domestic law, i.e. the 
forum principally is not competent to annul the rules of the domestic law. However, there is no doubt 
if huge amounts of compensations are at stake, the country in question can decide to modify the 
domestic law, in other words, the ISDS can influence the domestic legislator indirectly. 
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The final requirement is that a trade agreement taking into consideration the 
environmental interest should make clear its relationship to the multilateral environmental 
agreements. One option could be that the most important relevant agreements previously 
concluded by the EU28 are to be listed explicitly in the text agreement. This concern is 
completely in compliance with the EU commitments to these issues, as mentioned before, 
as the EU has intended to make provisions regarding the multilateral environmental 
agreements already in the course of the Uruguay round. As the text of the TTIP is under 
negotiation, it is still unclear how the parties will address this context of the trade agreement. 
However, the agreement concluded between EU and Canada (CETA)29 contains detailed 
provisions on this issue in order to except all trade measures from the scope of the CETA, 
which are justified under a multilateral environmental agreement.30 This model can also be 
considered by the negotiators of the TTIP. 
4. REGULATORY IMPACTS OF THE TTIP:  
THE REGULATORY COOPERATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
STANDARDS
The early summaries of the Commission’s negotiation mandate highlighted the elimination 
of the regulatory trade barriers as a major issue. The term regulatory trade barriers refers to 
a variety of trade obstacles, which take can different forms. In general, two main categories 
are covered by non-tariff-barriers. This includes the whole range of quantitative restrictions 
that directly restrict market access, e.g. import quotas, and secondly, it covers regulations, 
which add to the cost importation, e.g. domestic regulations requiring expensive 
reconfiguration of products, such as adapting the technical parameters (environmental 
standards of cars, standards and product requirements of foods, administrative measures, 
etc.). Therefore, the terms typically refer to the behind-the-border barriers to trade.31 From 
the perspective of their effects, this category might cover the need to allow products 
separately for the markets involved, often on the basis of different procedures and conditions 
for admission; different industrial standards, packaging requirements and information or 
labelling obligations; regulation of access to public procurement procedures or economic 
development programs, such as the state export credit insurance and also different public 
policy (environmental, health or consumer etc.) standards and restrictions.32 
The majority of differences in the environmental standards can be explained by the 
different approach of the EU and US environmental regulations. In the EU, risk regulation 
is based on the precautionary principle, which requires demonstration that no danger e.g. to 
28 The most significant agreements are Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Convention on Biological Diversity, Rotterdam 
Convention on Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticide.
29 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of one part, and 
the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (2016) link 9. 
30 CETA Article 24.4. (2016) link 9. 
31 See Sadikov (2007). 
32 Expressive examples are examined by Lester and Barbee, illustrating how fruit and vegetable 
product can sizes or car headlights standards can operate as regulatory trade barriers, see Lester & 
Barbee (2013) 848.
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human, animal or plant health might emanate from the products in question. The evaluation 
of the potential dangers is principally based on scientific analysis. However, in cases where 
scientific data does not permit a complete evaluation of the risk, recourse to this principle 
may, for example, be used to stop distribution or order withdrawal from the market of 
products likely to be hazardous. In the United States, the approach is exactly the opposite – 
the risk-based approach allows the use of products as long as no considerable danger has 
been detected. As a result, a large number of materials that are banned in the EU because of 
their potential unsafe character are approved in the US as there is no scientific data that 
could demonstrate the grave danger to the public or animal, or plant health and life.
These differences in domestic regulations, technically, can be addressed by three major 
approaches, which are the standard techniques of the regulatory cooperation.33 The first 
method is the unification, which provides a tool for establishing the same requirements in 
all contracting countries. However, the unification has its limitations; namely, if strong 
industrial actors are competing in the market at stake, setting common standards is much 
more than difficult. However, it is not impossible: even today unified standards are working 
in several areas, like telecommunication, IT technologies, automotive industry, or 
international aviation and maritime transport. Secondly, the harmonisation implies the 
alignment of regulations to a single best practice. Usually a voluntary agreement, 
harmonization can be based on a reference to international standards from a standard-setting 
body, or simply involve coordination among nations. Countries basically agree to converge 
on a single standard or regulation. This is usually the most difficult way to achieve 
regulatory cooperation, in part because countries are reluctant to adjust their standards and 
also because the harmonisation of standards requires complete consensus. Thirdly, the 
principle of mutual recognition can also help to eliminate the regulatory trade barriers; it is 
especially useful in eliminating duplicative testing and certification processes.34
All of these approaches would facilitate trade by reducing the regulatory hurdles faced 
by prospective exporters on both sides in that they would save them the trouble of 
complying, and/or demonstrating that they have complied with, a different regulatory 
regime. The question arises, however, how the EU and US can find a compromise on these 
issues. Probably, the solution should simply be to remove regulatory divergences that are 
accidental or serve no purpose; however, it is inevitable that some inefficiency and higher 
costs must be accepted by both negotiating parties.35 
The methods of the regulatory cooperation are highly significant in the field of 
environmental policy because improper design can bring considerable risks for the high 
level environmental protection in the EU. It could occur, if the cooperation is based on the 
‘lesser denominator’ principle and therefore, the higher environmental standards of the 
European Union would be lowered. It cannot be denied that in some areas the environmental 
regulation of the United States are more demanding in comparison with the EU level of 
33 Lester (2013) 84.
34 Both the EU and the US have already concluded Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs), 
and the EU and the US even has common agreement on specific issues. The MRAs have the objective 
of promoting trade in goods between the contracting parties by facilitating market access. They are, in 
general, bilateral agreements, and aim to benefit industry by providing easier access to conformity 
assessment. The EU has currently MRAs with USA, and Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland. 
35 See Lester and Barbee’s example: if a car producer wants to sell vehicles in the United 
Kingdom, it must account for the UK’s use of left-hand drive traffic, see Lester & Barbee (2013) 856. 
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protection, e.g., specific energy efficiency requirements, or emission standards in some 
fields. However, the EU regulations are stricter in other fields e.g., ban of certain heavy 
metal substances;36 nanomaterials;37 some pesticides and biocides,38 fracking mining 
technology, or the most palpable example could be the EU GMO regulation. 
The question is how these regulatory differences can be addressed by trade agreements, 
specifically in the context of the future transatlantic agreement. The regulatory cooperation 
is not a new phenomenon in the trade relations and practice of the European Union and the 
United States. Even in the 1990s, efforts were made to establish cooperative institutional 
mechanisms. The first significant attempt was the ‘Transatlantic Declaration on EC–US 
Relations’.39 Cooperation on important political and economic matters was laid down as 
one of the most striking objectives of the Declaration, which had to be achieved through 
channels of consultations organised at several levels.40 In 1995, the initial institutional 
framework of cooperation was improved by the signing of the New Transatlantic Agenda 
(NTA).41 In the NTA, the European Union and the United States agreed to further 
cooperation based on four broad principles: promoting peace and stability, democracy and 
development around the world; responding to global challenges; and contributing to the 
expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; and building bridges across the 
Atlantic. The NTA set out specific committees and formalised the regulatory cooperation 
agreements and launched a series of civil society dialogues between interest groups in 
business, labour, environmental and consumer policy areas.42 The NTA was widely regarded 
as an overall genuine attempt at widening the depth of regulatory cooperation between the 
36 E.g. substance bans for electrical appliances, in which the use of heavy metals, first of all 
mercury and lead, are prohibited. 
37 A narrower definition applies in the US, which means that the environmental impacts of 
various materials are not included and their hazards cannot be counteracted. See Burger & Matthey 
(2015). 
38 Bioaccumulative and toxic substances (PBTs) and carcinogenic, mutagenic and teratogenic 
substances (CMRs) are banned in the EU. 
39 Transatlantic Declaration on EC–US Relations (1990) link 5. 
40 E.g. bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe between, on 
the one side, the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission, and on the 
other side, the President of the United States; bi-annual consultations between the European 
Community Foreign Ministers, with the Commission, and the US Secretary of State, alternately on 
either side of the Atlantic; ad hoc consultations between the Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika 
and the US Secretary of State; bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US 
Government at Cabinet level; briefings, as currently exist, by the Presidency to US Representatives on 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) meetings at the Ministerial level. 
41 The New Transatlantic Agenda (1995) link 4. 
42 The dialogues that were initiated by the NTA and developed over time between the EU and 
the US are many and include the following: the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), the Transatlantic Environment Dialogue (TAED) 
(inaugurated in 1999), the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) (launched in 1999), and the 
Transatlantic Labour Dialogue (TALD), the EU–US Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue, the EU–
US Development Dialogue, the EU–US Education Policy Forum, the EU–US Energy Council, the 
EU–US Task Force on Biotechnology Research, the EU-US Insurance Regulatory Dialogue. NTA 
also generated a range of unofficial dialogues that are not government sponsored, such as the 
Transatlantic Policy Network, the Transatlantic Dialogue on Sustainable Development, the 
Transatlantic Dialogue of Aviation and Climate Change and the Transatlantic Donors Dialogue.
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EU and the US but it was also heavily criticised for not delivering more substantial results. 
In particular, ‘it has been claimed that the “laundry list” of “deliverables” for each EU–US 
summit was not only overly bureaucratic but also failed to address and solve the major 
trade disputes that affect overall transatlantic relations.’43 In order to reflect on the criticism 
formulated on the shortcomings of the NTA, the EU and the US have made further steps to 
enhance the cooperation in establishing the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) in 
1998.44 From the perspective of the environmental policy, it was important, that the TEP 
introduced the mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) as a standard instrument and later in 
1999, ‘Transatlantic Early Warning System’ was also added to the cooperation. This system 
required the parties to take the other side’s interest into account at an early stage when 
formulating legislative or regulatory decisions. The main aim of this achievement was to 
prevent the escalation of a new regulation, which would have been based on entirely 
different concepts or approaches. The system, according to some critics, institutionalised an 
obstacle on the legislations also in the field of environmental policy.45 In order to improve 
the transatlantic policy and regulatory cooperation, the parties established a new institution, 
the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in 2007, which was similar to many of the other 
initiatives that have been pursued since the early 1990s to advance the goal of deepening 
the economic cooperation. TEC has achieved some results regarding EU–US regulatory 
cooperation in selected areas.46
Finally, the question can be raised how the TTIP might add new approaches to the 
cooperation. The EU draft text and the stance to these topics are already public even though 
the texts of the new agreement have not yet been agreed. The European Commission 
published its proposal for the design of regulatory cooperation in the free trade agreement 
between the US and the EU on 10 February 2015.47 The underlying method, which can be 
derived from the document, is harmonisation. The negotiating parties have to identify 
certain issues, in which harmonisation seems to be feasible and then, the EU and US 
regulatory standards should gradually be brought closer through a unilateral ‘dynamic 
process’ during in the course of the negotiations. This process of harmonisation should also 
be maintained in a bilateral way after the completion of the TTIP negotiations. It is most 
likely, however, that the ‘dynamic process’ will not result in substantial harmonisation, 
i.e. no unilateral adjustment of US standards to the higher EU environmental regulation will 
be made. The cost of the higher standards and the consequential loss of competitiveness 
could also influence the ratification process of the agreement. 
43 Alemanno (2014) 27. 
44 Transatlantic Economic Partnership (1998) link 6. 
45 As a striking example, it is most likely that the system could prevent the escalation of a 
dispute such as regarding hush kits. This revolved around the EU legislation banning the use of hush-
kit outfitted aircraft in the EU, thus reducing the value of the mostly American used airplanes so 
equipped and hurting the profits of American hush kit manufacturers. By the time the US authorities 
and relevant industries became aware of the potential trade consequences stemming from such a 
proposal, the text was already in second reading in the European Parliament, see Alemanno (2014) 27.
46 E.g. the area of electric cars, ICT services, investment, mutual recognition of organic labelled 
products; the common understanding on regulatory principles and best practices and the standards 
bridge building documents, reinforced cooperation in emerging areas such as nanotechnology and 
e-health etc. See Alemanno (2014) 19.
47 See Textual Proposal of the European Commission for legal text on Regulatory Cooperation 
in TTIP (10 February 2015) link 3. 
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The proposal also lays down the institutional setting of the EU and domestic 
standardisation beyond harmonisation. The coordination would be carried out within a 
Regulatory Cooperation Body and the process would involve stakeholders. According to 
the document, in the future the parties would be required to inform the other party on the 
planned regulatory measures at the earliest stage of decision making, which would help to 
take into consideration the likely effects these might cause. 
Two extreme scenarios can be derived from the perspective of the higher and stricter 
EU environmental standards. First, nothing will happen – the EU will not engage in 
negotiation in order to find a compromise of the harmonisation and therefore, its standards 
will not be made softer in this regulatory field. The second scenario is, that even though the 
aim of the dynamic process could not be fully achieved by the time the agreement is 
concluded, the harmonisation of standards will continue in the framework of TTIP 
regulatory cooperation and if the harmonisation required a compromise between the parties, 
it would lead to a softening of the precautionary principle method towards the risk-based 
US approach. This second scenario, namely lowering of the higher EU environmental 
standards would be problematic in not only ecological but also economic terms. In certain 
areas, the EU economy has a technological competitive advantage due to higher 
environmental standards, thus, harmonisation with lower US standards or recognition of 
their equivalence would mean giving up ecological and economic benefits as well.48 
5. CONCLUSION – HOW TO AVOID THE ‘RACE TO THE BOTTOM’ 
HARMONISATION
The role and position of the European Union to the ‘Trade and Environment’ debate, 
compared to the US stance, represents a very strong commitment to the real inclusion of 
environmental concerns into the legal framework of the world trade. It has the consequence, 
from the perspective of the environmental policy, that a successful compromise can only be 
reached if the striking divergence between the positions of the parties will be reconciled. 
However, it is hard to pave the way to a mutually acceptable agreement because of the 
broad differences in the positions of the parties and also because of their specific economic 
and sectoral industrial interests. 
The potential regulatory implications have shown the unavoidable need to strengthen 
environmental protection, in the context of the future agreement, in order to avoid both the 
negative environmental and economic impacts. This risk seems to be tackled with the 
following two regulatory ‘pillars’ of the future agreement. The EU negotiators should pay 
attention to the opportunity in the ‘race-to-the-top harmonisation’. For this result, the 
systematic examination would be needed to discover all areas of the environmental 
regulation, where the harmonisation could bring positive environmental (and also economic) 
impacts on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, an important point would be to shape well 
the text of the regulatory chapter of the future agreement, considering strong rules regarding 
the environmental policy, specifying the policy leeway of the parties and giving clear 
48 Strong EU standards in certain industrial fields where the US industry is not yet 
technologically capable of meeting the same standards, for instance, pollution of the so-called 
‘F-gases’ (fluorinated greenhouse gases), see Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 842/2006.
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meaning and content for particular principles (e.g. right to regulate, good regulatory 
practices etc.).
 There are countless uncertainties regarding the content of the future agreement even at 
this stage of negotiations. Consideration of the above examined questions is essential if 
Cecilia Malmström’s tweet is wanted to come true. 
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